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CASE LAW ANALYSIS 
Restricting the Application of EIA 
for Agricultural Projects
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v Alford 
Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court, Divisional Court 
[2005] EWHC 808 (Admin) 
Brooke LJ and David Steel J 
The Judgment 
The following judgment was given: 
BROOKE LJ: 
This is the judgment of the Court. 
Introduction 
1 This is an appeal by way of case stated by the defendant Ellen Mary Alford arising out of
her conviction at the Plymouth Magistrates’ Court on 10 June 2004 on four charges of car-
rying out projects on land she owned at Vixen Tor Farm, Merrivale, Dartmoor without
obtaining a screening decision or the grant of consent by the Secretary of State, contrary to
regulation 19 of the Environmental Impact Assessment (Uncultivated Land and Semi-
natural Areas) (England) Regulations 2001 (‘the 2001 Regulations’). 
2 The projects in question involved the application of farmyard manure and calcified sea-
weed to four of her fields between 31 March and 13 April 2003. In the Case Stated Deputy
District Judge Tate said that he found the following facts: 
A. No application was ever made for a screening decision, and no consent was given by
the Secretary of State for the project. 
B. Vixen Tor Farm is a grassland farm consisting of approximately 56 acres of land
bordering the open common land of Dartmoor of which the four compartments
of land referred to in the informations, Vixen Tor, and Fields 1, 2 and 3, form
part. 
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C. From 1966 until 2002 the farm was tenanted by farmers called Cole. It appeared to
have been abandoned by them. There was no evidence of cultivation, nothing was
applied in terms of fertilizer or additives, and it was kept as grazing moor land. It
was maintained in its natural habitat. The boundary walls and fences had been
allowed to fall into disrepair and livestock from the common land had relatively
unrestricted access to the farm. 
D. The land came within the description ‘uncultivated land, or semi-natural areas’. 
E. The appellant carried out an intervention in the natural surroundings and
landscape of the four compartments of land, by the application of farmyard manure
and calcified seaweed. The purpose was to make the grass palatable to cattle. It was
intended to graze 40 suckler cows on the land. The boundary walls and fences had
been repaired and made stock proof. On Vixen Tor Field, Field 1, and Field 2
farmyard manure was spread at the rate of four cubic yards per acre, and calcified
seaweed at the rate of 200 kilos per acre. On Field 3 only farmyard manure was
spread, at the rate of four cubic yards per acre. 
3 The Case Stated continued in the following terms: 
3. It was contended by the Appellant that the project did not involve the use of the
land for ‘intensive agricultural purposes’. She contended that the question was not
whether the project intensified the agricultural purposes to which the land was put,
but whether the land was used for intensive agricultural purposes. Reliance was
placed upon a definition of the word ‘intensive’ in the New Oxford Dictionary of
English (Second Edition 2003) ‘(of agriculture): aiming to achieve maximum
production within a limited area, especially by using chemical and technological
aids; intensive farming. Often contrasted with extensive’. 
4. It was contended by the Respondent that any works to increase the agricultural
usefulness of the land, thereby intensifying the agricultural purposes above the
current agricultural purposes, met the requirement. Reliance was placed upon the
definition of the word ‘intensive’ in the Oxford English Dictionary: ‘applied to
methods of cultivation, fishery etc, which increase the productiveness of a given
area; opposed to extensive in which the area of production is extended’. 
5. I concluded that prior to 2002 no effort had been made to farm the land and it had
been effectively abandoned. The appellant had repaired the boundary walls and
fences and made the farm stock proof. The project involved the application of
farmyard manure and calcified seaweed to the land in order to increase its
productive value, and enable the raising of 40 suckler cows on the land. I decided
that the project came within the definition of use of the land for intensive
agricultural purposes, and followed the definition of the word ‘intensive’ in the
Oxford English Dictionary. 
I found the appellant guilty of all four offences. I fined the appellant £250 on
each offence making a total of £1,000 and ordered her to make a contribution
to the prosecution costs of £5,000. 
6. The question for the opinion of the High Court is what is meant by the phrase
‘intensive agricultural purposes’ in regulation 2(1) of the Environmental Impact
Assessment Regulations 2001. Does an increase in the productiveness of a given
area, or an intensification of the agricultural purposes to which the land is put
come within the definition? Did the appellant’s project amount to an intervention
in the natural surroundings and landscape involving the use of uncultivated land or
semi-natural areas for intensive agricultural purposes? 
4 The Explanatory Note to the 2001 Regulations makes it clear that they are concerned to
implement two EC directives which have a bearing on the control of projects for the use of
uncultivated land and semi-natural areas in England for intensive agricultural purposes.
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These are Council Directive 85/337/EEC, as amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC
of 3 March 1997 (‘the EIA Directive’), on the effect of certain public and private
projects on the environment, and Council Directive 1992/43/EEC, as amended (‘the
Habitats Directive’), insofar as it has any application to such projects. Mr Blair, who
appeared for the respondent department (‘DEFRA’), accepted that while the contents
of the Habitats Directive might colour the department’s decision-making progress once
a project had been correctly identified as one involving the use of uncultivated land or
semi-natural areas for intensive agricultural purposes, they could not affect one way or
other the question whether that project had been correctly so categorised. 
5 The EIA Directive was implemented in our national planning law by the Town and
Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) Regulations
1999 (‘the 1999 Regulations’). The agricultural or agriculturally-related operations that
are most relevant to the uncultivated land provisions with which we are concerned do
not, however, require planning permission. A parallel system of control, administered by
DEFRA, was therefore required to ensure that the requirements of the EIA Directive
were also complied with in the agricultural sphere. Hence the 2001 Regulations. The
scheme set out in both the 1999 and the 2001 Regulations provides that whereby if a
‘project’ falls within one of the categories set out in Annex II of the EIA Directive (and
if, in connection with the 1999 Regulations, its scale exceeds the threshold, if any, that is
set out in those regulations in respect of that type of project), the relevant statutory
authority must consider it and make what is called a screening decision. It has to decide
whether the project’s effects are sufficiently significant, so far as the environment is con-
cerned, to warrant the preparation of what is called an environmental statement. The
publication of this statement will then inform the decision-making process that is con-
cerned with determining whether to permit the project to proceed notwithstanding its
effect on the environment. 
6 From the outset the EIA Directive divided the projects which might fall within its ambit
into two lists. If a project was placed in the list in Annex I, it was mandatory to provide
the requisite statement. If it was placed in the list in Annex II, on the other hand, it was
for the Member States to decide whether a statement was required. The preamble to the
1997 amending directive shows how experience had shown that the scheme should be
strengthened in certain respects. The list in Annex I, in particular, was greatly enlarged,
and the list in Annex II was also extended. 
7 Paragraph 1(b) of Annex II of the EIA Directive, both in its original and in its amended
form, includes among the projects which may, at the discretion of a Member State, be
subject to an environmental impact assessment 
Projects for the use of uncultivated land or semi-natural areas for intensive
agricultural purposes. 
8 This is included in a list numbered 1 under the heading ‘Agriculture, silviculture and
aquaculture’. The other items on this list, as it appears in the amended directive are: 
(a) Projects for the restructuring of rural land holdings; 
(c) Water management projects for agriculture, including irrigation and land drainage
projects; 
(d) Initial afforestation and deforestation for the purposes of conversion to another
type of land use; 
(e) Intensive livestock installations (projects not included in Annex 1); 
(f) Intensive fish farming; 
(g) Reclamation of land from the sea.” 
9 Incidentally, Annex I to the EIA Directive includes in its amended form a new item 17: 
Installations for the intensive rearing of poultry or pigs with more than 
(a)85,000 places for broilers, 60,000 places for hens; 
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(b)3,000 places for production pigs (over 30 kg); or 
(c)900 places for sows. 
With this exception, the Directive casts no further light on the meaning of the word
“intensive”. 
10 In the field of planning law the 1999 Regulations excluded plots less than 0.5 hectares in
size from consideration if they were otherwise embraced by category (b) in the list of
agricultural projects in Annex II of the directive, but the 2001 Regulations contain no
such threshold. DEFRA has explained in a helpful guidance note on its website that it
decided not to apply thresholds because some very small areas of land may be environ-
mentally valuable. 
11 We must now say a little about certain features of the 2001 Regulations before we turn to
the question of interpretation at the centre of this appeal. 
12 Regulation 2, which is concerned with ‘Interpretation’ identifies the two directives which
the regulations are concerned to implement, and Regulation 2(2) provides that: 
(2) Unless it is otherwise provided, expressions used both in these Regulations and in
the EIA Directive or in the Habitats Directive shall have the same meaning in these
Regulations as they have in those respective Directives. 
13 Regulation 2(1) defines the word ‘project’ as meaning: 
(a) the execution of construction works or other installations or schemes; or 
other interventions in the natural surroundings and landscape, 
involving the use of uncultivated land or semi-natural areas for intensive
agricultural purposes. 
14 It is not in issue on this appeal that the appellant’s land was properly to be regarded as
uncultivated (or a semi-natural area); the question we have to determine is whether her
project involved the use of her land for intensive agricultural purposes. If it did, it did
not qualify for any exemption under Regulation 3(2) or (3), and Regulation 4 prohib-
ited her from beginning or carrying out a project without first obtaining a screening
decision. Regulation 5 shows that the screening process enables the Secretary of State to
decide whether the project is likely to have a significant effect on the environment. If it
does, it becomes a ‘relevant project’ for the purposes of the Regulations so that it may
not be begun or carried out without the Secretary of State’s consent. Finally, Regulation
19, under which the appellant was convicted, provides that: 
Any person who begins or carries out a project without first obtaining either a
decision that the project is not a relevant project or a decision granting consent for
the project in accordance with these Regulations shall be guilty of an offence and
liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale. 
15 We have been told that there is no English or ECJ case-law which casts any light on the
meaning of the words ‘intensive agricultural purposes’. It is, however, instructive to note
that in Aannemersbedrijf P K Kraaijeveld Bv e.a v Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland [1996]
ECR I-0503 the European Court of Justice was concerned to interpret the words ‘canali-
zation and flood-relief works’ which appeared in point 10(e) of Annex II to the EIA
Directive in its unamended form. One of the questions which arose in that case was
whether the phrase embraced dyke work along navigable waters which was carried for
the purpose of retaining water and preventing floods. 
16 After observing that the different language versions of point 10(e) fell into two categories
according to whether the terms employed denoted the idea of flooding—the English and
Finnish versions did, while nine other versions, including the Dutch (which referred merely
to ‘canalization and regulation of watercourses’) did not—the court said at paras 30–33: 
30 Given that divergence, one must go to the purpose and general scheme of the
directive. According to Article 1(2) of the directive, ‘project’ means the ‘execution
of construction works or of other installations or schemes’ and ‘other interventions
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in the natural surroundings and landscape including those involving the extraction
of mineral resources’. According to Article 2(1), the directive is aimed at ‘projects
likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue inter alia of their
nature, size of location’. Article 3 provides that the environmental impact
assessment is to identify, describe and assess the direct and indirect effects of a
project on human beings, fauna and flora, soil, water, air, climate and the landscape,
material assets and the cultural heritage. 
31 The wording of the directive indicates that it has a wide scope and a broad
purpose. That observation alone should suffice to interpret point 10(e) of Annex
II to the directive as encompassing all works for retaining water and preventing
floods, and therefore dyke works, even if not all the linguistic versions are so
precise. 
32 Even if, as argued by the Government of the Netherlands, dyke works consist in the
construction or raising of the height of embankments in order to contain
watercourses and avoid flooding, works retaining a static quantity of water, rather
than a running watercourse, may have a significant effect on the environment
within the meaning of the directive where they are liable permanently to affect the
composition of the soil, flora and fauna or the landscape. Such works must
therefore fall under the directive. 
33 Consequently, the argument of the Government of the Netherlands that dyke work
does not alter the course of a waterway is not well founded. 
17 This judgment contains a salutary reminder that in interpreting regulations based on EC
law it is incumbent on a national court, if confronted with a dispute about the meaning
of a phrase used in a directive, to identify the purposes of the directive and adopt a
meaning (provided that the words are capable of bearing that meaning) which best pro-
motes the wide scope and broad purpose of the directive. 
18 When we first read these papers we were surprised to see that a project which involved
no more than the re-invigoration of farmland which had been badly neglected for many
years could properly be categorised as one which used the land for intensive agricultural
purposes. Mr Blair did not suggest that the application of farmyard manure and calcified
seaweed in the volumes described in finding E in the Case Stated (see para 2 above)
could have been calculated to raise the productivity of the land above what could norm-
ally be expected of such land if it had not fallen into a state of neglect. We were fortified
in my original impression by the definition contained in the second edition of the New
Oxford Dictionary of English (2003) at p 901: 
intensive (of agriculture) aiming to achieve maximum production within a limited
area, especially by using chemical and technological aids: intensive farming. 
For what it is worth, Mr Blair accepted that no chemical or technological aids were used
in this case. 
19 Our initial impressions were then confirmed by DEFRA’S own guidelines, in which they
said (at para 15): 
We will need to judge individual cases to see whether the land use resulting from
the proposed operations is ‘for intensive agricultural purposes’. We will take
account of whether the project involves using the land at greater than the average
agricultural intensity for the activity in question. (emphasis added) 
20 Mr Blair, however, argued that his clients were entitled to take the view that this project
qualified for screening under the 2001 Regulations. He said that uncultivated and semi-
natural areas have been decimated by agricultural practice in the decades since the Sec-
ond World War, and that this process has brought about the destruction of important
habitats for flora and fauna. As a result, species of flora and fauna have been seriously
damaged and even extinguished. 
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21 In this case the land had been abandoned to nature for decades without the application
of fertiliser—the evidence showed that it contained less than 10% of rye grass and clo-
ver, on which cattle will thrive—and he said that there can be a significant impact on the
environment from a relatively small intensification of the agricultural productiveness of
an area. Through neglect the land had become a significant habitat for acid loving flora,
and the appellant’s intervention was intended to bring this state of affairs to an end. In
these circumstances he submitted that a project designed to cultivate previously unculti-
vated land was one designed for an intensive agricultural purpose. It was proper to com-
pare the state of the land after it had been fertilised with its neglected state before the
project commenced. This was the legitimate comparison, and not a comparison with
land in a normal state of cultivation. 
22 Mr Blair explained to us the dilemma that faced his clients in trying to police the regula-
tions if their preferred approach was not upheld. It is relatively easy to identify for
screening purposes a project which intensifies the agricultural potential of the land over
and above its pre-existing state. It is far less easy to identify projects which intensify the
agricultural productivity of land above the norm for land in an ordinary state of cultiva-
tion, and the need to protect threatened flora and fauna is sufficiently pressing that the
court should accept that his client’s approach was correct in law. In this context he drew
comfort from the Oxford English Dictionary meaning of ‘intensive’ which the district judge
quoted in para 4 of the Case Stated (see para 3 above). 
23 When one examines that definition, however, and the nineteenth century examples of
the usage of the phrase, it is obvious that the distinction made in the dictionary between
intensive cultivation and an intensive fishery on the one hand, and extensive cultivation
and an extensive fishery on the other, shows that what is in contemplation is an increase
in the productivity of cultivated land, or of a fishery. The two suggested options are to
use intensive methods to obtain greater productivity from the same area, or to eschew
intensive methods and to extend the area of production. I do not consider that this defi-
nition takes Mr Blair’s case any further forward. 
24 In his written submissions he drew attention to the fact that the Secretary of State for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs is identified at the start of the 2001 Regulations as
a Minister designated for the purposes of section 2(2) of the European Communities
Act 1972 in relation to measures relating to the conservation of natural habitats and of
wild fauna and flora. This reference was needed, however, to show that she had the legal
power to introduce regulations to give effect to the Habitats Directive. We have already
observed, however, that there is nothing in the Habitats Directive that throws any useful
light on the interpretation of the words ‘for intensive agricultural purposes’. 
25 We did not obtain any assistance from DEFRA’s explanation in its Guidelines that relev-
ant cultivations could include spreading soil or other material, including fertiliser or
lime in excess of existing routine application rates. Even if fertiliser and lime had not
been applied for many years (so that there were no existing routine application rates
and any new application would have exceeded what was there before), this explanation
of the concept of ‘cultivations’ casts no light at all on the meaning of the words ‘for
intensive agricultural purposes’ on which, as we have observed, DEFRA’s Guidelines
favoured the appellant’s case. 
26 Nor did we obtain any assistance from the argument that DEFRA had decided not to
insert any quantity threshold criteria in relation to this item in the first list in Annex II,
whereas such thresholds appeared elsewhere in the EIA Directive and in the 1999 Regu-
lations. Either this project came within the definition of ‘project’ in Regulation 2 (see
para 13 above) or it did not. 
27 In our judgment it did not. We do not consider that what was done in this case was capable
of being described as an intervention for intensive agricultural purposes, and although
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we remind ourselves that the EIA Directive has a wide scope and a broad purpose, we do
not consider that its framers intended it to catch a project that was concerned only to
bring land back to a normal level of agricultural productivity. 
28 For these reasons we would allow this appeal and grant the appellant a defendant’s costs
order both in this court and below. 
29 The answers to the questions posed by the deputy district judge are therefore: 
(i) No, unless the productivity of the land for agricultural purposes is intensified above
the norm. 
(ii) No. 
Analysis by Donald McGillivray, Kent Law School1 
Introduction 
Although only a first instance decision, and a fairly short one at that, Alford is an
instructive case on some central environmental law issues. In particular, the case raises
questions about what we understand by the ‘natural environment’2 and some of the
difficulties in using law to regulate threats to that kind of environment, especially here
where the potential ecological harm arises from the resumption of agricultural prac-
tices. The Alford decision also acts as a useful insight into issues about the customarily
hands off approach of environmental law to matters agricultural; about drafting and
practical implementation of environmental rules, especially rules originating in EC
environmental law; and about enforcement styles. Above all, it concerns the interpre-
tation to be given to the phrase ‘intensive agricultural purposes’ in deciding whether
environmental impact assessment is required for certain agricultural activities. 
Agriculture, EIA and the UK 
To understand the wider context in which the Alford prosecution arose we need to
consider the legislative history of the 1985 EIA Directive and its UK implementation.
The judgment in Alford charitably glosses over the extraordinary delay in transposing
the requirements of the Directive in relation to agriculture. Although the 1997
amending Directive clarified the point that consent procedures had to be required
for projects that fell within the scope of the Directive, arguably this was always
implicit from a purposive reading of the original Directive. Hence, the 2001 Regula-
tions at issue here can be seen as being implemented over 13 years after the 1988
deadline for transposition of the original Directive. As the Minister responsible
remarked of the issue in 2000, ‘To be honest, it has been sat on for many reasons’.3 
To understand why the UK4 delayed we need to go back to the lengthy pre-legislative
phase of the 1985 EIA Directive. A key concern then was to avoid the US experience
1 I am grateful to Heler Byron, Bill Howarth, Richard Macrory and Chris Rodgers for comment on a draft of
this note. The usual disclaimers apply. 
2 ‘[The land] was kept as grazing moor land. It was maintained in its natural habitat’ (para 2). 
3 HC Hansard, 24 November 2000, Vol. 357, Col 599 (Eliot Morley). 
4 The position is broadly the same beyond England; see the Environmental Impact Assessment (Unculti-
vated Land and Semi-Natural Areas) (Scotland) Regulations 2002 (SSI 2002/6), the Environmental Impact
Assessment (Uncultivated Land and Semi-Natural Areas) (Wales) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/2127 (W.214)
and the Environmental Impact Assessment (Uncultivated Land and Semi-Natural Areas) (Northern Ireland)
Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/435). 
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with implementing the National Environmental Protection Act 1970 (NEPA). This,
the seminal provision on environmental assessment, gave rise to much litigation in
the interpretation of the requirement for an environmental impact statement for
‘every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and any other major
Federal Actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment’.5 As Richard
Macrory has recently noted in this Journal, ‘the spectre of US environmental litiga-
tion haunted much of the discussion and negotiation during the development of the
EC Directive’.6 An additional factor may also have been that the US approach, of
enacting ambitious statutes and relying on the courts to work out the details, was dif-
ficult to reconcile with what, at the time at least, was a much more detailed approach
taken to the drafting of Community legislation.7 As a result, by the time of the 1980
draft Directive,8 the split-list system had been agreed upon, under which certain
projects would require mandatory assessment (Annex I projects), whereas for those
projects in Annex II of the Directive, assessment would only be required if they
would be likely to give rise to significant environmental effects. While agricultural
projects had originally featured in Annex I, by the time of the 1980 draft Directive
they had been placed in Annex II and made subject to discretionary assessment. The
main reason for this was, it seems, UK insistence, without which—under unanimity—
no Directive could have been agreed.9 
The key Parliamentary debates on the draft Directive took place at the same time
that the Wildlife and Countryside Bill was making its contested passage through the
House of Lords. This gave rise both to an appreciation of the damage that agricul-
ture could cause to the natural environment, but also to the passage of the Wildlife
and Countryside Act 1981 which decisively continued the voluntary approach to
nature conservation. Some actors thought that the provisions of the draft EIA Direc-
tive could be a powerful tool to counteract the absence of the agricultural use of
land from planning law and the availability of environmentally-insensitive grants for
agriculture. But, as has been argued, one reason why the UK felt able to accept the
EIA Directive was because of its belief that only the provisions relating to Annex I
projects had any practical legal force.10 Most of these were subject to existing con-
sent procedures and in many cases would be subject to a public inquiry, leading the
government to argue that this amounted to compliance with the Directive.11 There
was never any government desire to apply EIA to projects falling within Annex II of
the Directive unless this was expedient. The later stages of the negotiation of the
Directive also coincided with the period of the first Thatcher administrations and
5 S 102 National Environmental Protection Act 1970 (US). 
6 R. Macrory, ‘Principles of Judicial Review on Environmental Assessment’ (2004) 16 JEL 2 at 279, 285. 
7 W.R. Sheate and R.B. Macrory, ‘Agriculture and the EC Environmental Assessment Directive: Lessons for
Community Policy-Making’ (1989) 28 JCMS 1 at 68, 71. 
8 COM(80), 313, OJ C 169/14, 9 July 1980. 
9 Sheate and Macrory, n 7 above. The UK Department of the Environment was originally reluctant to agree
to mandatory EIA for any projects, see House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Envi-
ronmental Assessment of Projects, eleventh Report, Session 1980–81, HL 69. 
10 Sheate and Macrory, n 7 above at 73–74. 
11 A view taken up to the point when the main tranche of implementing regulations were being enacted. See,
for example, Lord Caithness, House of Lords, Hansard, Vol. 492, No. 1380, 27 January 1988: ‘The planning sys-
tem in Great Britain already ensures that the environmental implications of new development are considered
before permission is granted’. This view neglected the structured nature of considering environmental informa-
tion, and the role of public consultation in this process, which would later be so central to cases such as Berkeley v
Secretary of State for the Environment and Fulham Football Club (Berkeley No. 1) [2001] AC 603; (2001) 13 JEL at 89. 
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their deregulatory desire to reduce the scope of planning law and ease the regula-
tory burden on business.12 And ‘when it came to implementation of the Directive,
the UK Department of the Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food in particular [chose] to remain silent on the subject of the cultivation of
semi-natural areas’.13 Untouched by town and country planning controls,14 and
indeed actively supported by generous grant aid,15 these provisions led to a ‘do noth-
ing’ approach to implementation. Any attempt at regulating these activities would
have cut across the approaches being taken to nature conservation law and to
planning control, and might have opened a Pandora’s box of legal controls over
agriculture. 
The Commission Intervenes 
The questionable approach of the UK towards EIA and agriculture received its first
formal challenge at the time of the 1992 furore over the extension of the M3 motor-
way at Twyford Down and other headline development and infrastructure projects.
As a part of a political deal that was cut at the time, the Commission terminated
infringement proceedings against the UK in relation to a number of infrastructure
projects (the M3 extension at Twyford Down, the M11 Link Road and the Channel
Tunnel Rail Link)16 in return for the UK accepting, amongst other things, that EIA
procedures should be applied to the use of semi-natural and uncultivated land for
intensive agricultural projects.17 However, it took a further decade, and a certain
amount of sailing close to the wind in relation to the European Court of Justice,18
before legislation in England and in each of the devolved administrations was enacted.
12 See, generally, N. Haigh, ‘Environmental Assessment – the EC Directive’ [1987] JPL 4; J. Holder, Environ-
mental Assessment (Oxford: OUP, 2004) at 265. 
13 Sheate and Macrory, n 7 above at 75. The Agriculture Ministry did not even participate in implementation
working groups on the grounds that most agricultural practice was outside the scope of the planning laws and
therefore not affected by the Directive; see P. Wathern, ‘The EIA Directive of the European Community’ in
P. Wathern (ed.), Environmental Impact Assessment: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 1988) at 192–209, 205. 
14 Although projects for the use of uncultivated land or semi-natural areas for intensive agricultural purposes
have always been included in Schedule 2 to the general implementing regulations covering town and country
planning, this was always meaningless, since these activities fall outside the town and country planning system. 
15 The justification for not formally applying EIA to initial afforestation projects for many years was to link it
with grant aid; see, generally, C. Reid, ‘The Changing Pattern of Environmental Regulation: British Forestry
and the Environmental Agenda’ (1997) 9 JEL 23 at 38. In 1980, 50% grants were available for conversion of
open morrland to ryegrass lots; see M. Shoard, The Theft of the Countryside (London: Temple Smith, 1980) at 77. 
16 By press release; see IP/92/669, and see, generally, P. Kunzlik, ‘Environmental Impact Assessment: The
British Cases’ (1995) 4 EELR at 336. 
17 HC Written Answers, 16.12.1992, Cols 319–20. See J. Holder, Environmental Assessment (Oxford: OUP,
2004) at 50. The UK also agreed to drop proposals for the East London River Crossing which would have affec-
ted ancient woodland at Oxleas Wood. On the Commission problematically accepting guarantees ‘equivalent’
to those required by the EIA Directive, and the controversy generally see P. Kunzlik, ‘The Lawyer’s Assessment’
in B. Bryant (ed.), Twyford Down: Roads, Campaigning and Environmental Law (London: E and F N Spon, 1996). 
18 Commission moves against Spain, Italy, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands over Impact Assessment
Directive, IP/01/1166; Case C-421/02 Commission v UK [24 June 2004, ECJ]. Whether the Commission has
any great enthusiasm to prosecute for non-transposition of this provision is unclear. There appear to be no
reported infraction proceedings that have reached the Court of Justice, and it must be somewhat doubtful
whether the Commission would take infringement proceedings for practical non-compliance. Where impacts
on the environmental media or on conservation interests are at stake then these are likely to be the subject of
other, more specialist, provisions of EC law. But otherwise, the significant environmental effects from, say,
ploughing uncultivated land, such as impacts on archaeological features, might be such that, as a matter of sen-
sitivity to subsidiarity, the Commission might be reluctant to take enforcement action. 
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During this period the failure to implement EIA in relation to certain agricultural
operations was not without environmental consequences. For example, as the House
of Commons Select Committee noted in its inquiry into the serious flooding of 2000, 
The difficult question is what to do about damaging agricultural practices, especially in view
of the low level of current farm incomes. One thing we can be certain about is the need to
apply the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive to agriculture. … [The Directive] has
applied for several years to many types of development, but MAFF has managed to delay its
implementation for 15 [sic] years … It is salutary to consider that a contributory cause of the
recent floods may have been the determination of MAFF over many years not to implement
the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive. This is a grave condemnation of this Minis-
try. We welcome the statement by the Minister for Agriculture and the Countryside that these
regulations will now be issued. This must be done as a matter of urgency.19 
The Agricultural EIA Regulations: Law and Practice 
Various points may be made about the shape of the Environmental Impact Assessment
(Uncultivated Land and Semi-Natural Areas) (England) Regulations 2001 (henceforth
‘the Agricultural EIA Regulations’) that, as I argue below, may be material to how
the Alford case should have been decided. 
The first is that the Regulations are unique in the UK in relation to the implemen-
tation of the EIA Directive in their use of the criminal law to secure implementation.
It is tempting to say that a consent procedure has—for the first time—been estab-
lished, because projects must be screened for the significance of their environmental
impact and, if they are likely to give rise to significant environmental effects, then an
Environmental Statement must be submitted to DEFRA and the consent of the Sec-
retary of State given. However, it might be more accurate to say that the Regulations
have gone out of their way to avoid the setting up of a consent system. While the Reg-
ulations provide for criminal liability if uncultivated land is brought into more inten-
sive production without the submission of a request for a screening opinion, the
offence is a stand-alone one and is not linked to any prior approval regime. By contrast,
most other regulations which implement the EIA directive link screening with an
existing consent system, so that the penalty for not submitting an environmental
statement or for not submitting a project proposal to screening is simply that the regu-
lator is prevented from issuing any consent until, if need be, environmental information
is properly considered. 
The direct use of the criminal law in this way has some important consequences. It
contributes in part to the very light touch that is taken in practice by DEFRA to the
exercise of its powers under the Regulations. Although there have been a handful of
successful prosecutions under this provision,20 these have tended to follow tip-offs
from members of the general public, and there has been little or no routine enforce-
ment activity by DEFRA. More notably, when screening opinions are sought it is
DEFRA policy to make a site visit and advise the landowner on how to pursue his or
her objectives without triggering the need to submit an environmental statement.
A common approach is by suggesting to farmers how they might shape their proposals
19 HC Select Committee on the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs, Second Report, Development
on, or Affecting, the Flood Plain, HC 64, Session 2000–01, para 44. 
20 For a note on two early prosecutions see ENDS Report 353, July 2004 at 62. 
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so that they would not require screening, for example by DEFRA officials offering
suggestions on how the proposal might come within one of the financial incentive
schemes that currently operate.21 The success of this strategy can be seen from the
striking fact that no environmental statements have ever been required, and hence
no consent decisions made.22 But it also emphasises the point that the Agricultural
EIA Regulations do not provide a general consent system; only where projects have
been identified as being likely to have significant environmental effects and these
have not been able to be mitigated or the project proposal modified will they fall
within the consent system in the Regulations. Or, in other words, there is no fallback
control regime if these high hurdles are not cleared,23 because the use of land for
agriculture is excluded from the town and country planning regime.24 This might be
considered a valid reason for interpreting the provisions of the Agricultural EIA Regu-
lations generously in favour of DEFRA. 
However, a further consequence of the use of the criminal law is that the general
presumptions of the criminal law in favour of the defendant will apply. This is
important because, while the definition at issue may carry an autonomous meaning
as a matter of EC law (see below), it nevertheless adds an additional factor to the
interpretive mix that is not present when, for example, provisions of the main town
and country planning EIA Regulations are at stake. Hence, it may not be possible
simply to read across from the general case law on the interpretation of the EIA
Directive (discussed below) since this jurisprudence has invariably arisen in the con-
text of administrative decision-making. 
The Alford Case and the Definition of ‘Intensive Agricultural Purposes’ 
The law in relation to whether an activity falls within one of the project categories in
Annexes I or II of the EIA Directive is now most definitively expressed in the Big Yellow
Property Co case.25 In deciding whether the construction of a warehouse and self-storage
building was an ‘urban development project’ for the purposes of Schedule 2 to the
main EIA Regulations, the Court of Appeal stated that: 
However fact-sensitive such a determination may be, it is not simply a finding of fact nor of
discretionary judgement. Rather, it involves the application of the authority’s understanding
of the meaning in law of the expression used in the Regulation. If the authority reaches an
understanding of those expressions that is wrong as a matter of law, then the court must
21 See DEFRA, Environmental Impact Assessment for Use of Uncultivated Land or Semi-Natural Areas for
Intensive Agricultural Purposes: Guidelines (2002), para 3. 
22 Personal communication, DEFRA, 24 June 2005. A flavour of how the consent regime is intended to work
can be seen in Reg. 13(11)(c): ‘the consent authorises the project only as described in the consent application,
subject to any amendments approved by the Secretary of State pursuant to a request by the applicant …’. 
23 With the possible exception—where subsidy is linked to production—of agri-environmental cross-compliance;
see, e.g. the Common Agricultural Policy Single Payment and Support Schemes (Cross Compliance)
(England) Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/3196), Reg. 15. Under s 42 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981
moorland conservation orders can be made by the Secretary of State, but these apply only to land within
national parks and only provide for a 12-month waiting period within which to negotiate a suitable agreement
with the landowner. Very few have been made. 
24 S 55(2)(e) Town and Country Planning Act 1990. 
25 R (Goodman) v Lewisham London Borough [2003] Env LR 28. For comment see Macrory, n 6 above. Note
that Brooke LJ, the leading judge in Alford, also sat in Big Yellow. 
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correct that error: and in determining the meaning of the statutory expressions the concept
of reasonable judgment as embodied in Wednesbury simply has no part to play.26 
Buxton LJ went on: 
That, however, is not the end of the matter. The meaning in law may itself be sufficiently
imprecise that in applying it to the facts, as opposed to determining what the meaning was in
the first place, a range of different conclusions may be legitimately available. That approach
to decision-making was emphasised by Lord Mustill, speaking for the House of Lords, in R. v
Monopolies Commission ex parte South Yorkshire Transport Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 23 at p.32G, when
he said that there may be cases where the criterion, upon which in law the decision has to be
made: 
‘may itself be so imprecise that different decision-makers, each acting rationally, might
reach differing conclusions when applying it to the facts of a given case. In such a case the
court is entitled to substitute its own opinion for that of the person to whom the decision has
been entrusted only if the decision is so aberrant that it cannot be classed as rational’. 
Following Big Yellow, therefore, whether a project falls within a listed cate-
gory—which in relation to Annex II projects must precede the question whether
the project is likely to give rise to significant environment effects—is only ‘a
straight question of law’27 with this proviso. For the reasons given by Buxton LJ,
as well as further factors considered below, a more subtle approach may be
needed. 
There are three key stages to deciding whether a project falls within the wide28
scope of the Directive: (A) whether it falls within a project category—the categori-
sation question; (B) the legality of any thresholds that have been applied—the
threshold question; and (C) whether a project is likely to give rise to significant
environmental effects—the significance question. The balance of matters of law
over fact is clearly greatest in the categorisation question and weakest in the signif-
icance question but not to the complete exclusion of other factors.29 Decisions
about thresholds, however, involve a greater mix of matters of fact and law,
because as a matter of reviewing the legality of the setting of thresholds the discre-
tion of the national authorities must be tempered by the overriding consideration
in Article 2(1) of the Directive that projects with likely significant environmental
effects must be assessed.30 But the ‘pull’ of Article 2(1) decreases the further that
the decision involves matters where fidelity to project categorisation is at issue. As
noted above, the categorisation approach is important since, as well as providing
for a measure of legal certainty about which kinds of projects may require assess-
ment, it also reflects a central element of the legislative history and purposive
intent of the Directive. Similarly, the weight to be given to Article 2(1) decreases
26 Para 8. 
27 M. Grant, ‘Development and the Protection of Birds: The Swale Decision’ (1991) 3 JEL at 150. 
28 Case C-72/95 Aanemersbedriff P K Kraaijeveld BV v Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland [1996] ECR I-5403
(‘Dutch Dykes’), para 31 (‘The wording of the directive indicates that it has a wide scope and broad purpose’). 
29 See R (Jones) v Mansfield DC [2003] EWHC 7 (‘determination of “significance” (for Annex II projects) is a
matter for the administrative authorities, subject only to judicial review on conventional “Wednesbury” grounds’,
per Carnwath LJ, para 60 and see also R (Malster) v Ipswich Borough Council and Ipswich Town Football Club [2001]
EWHC Admin 711. 
30 Case C-72/95 Kraaijeveld (see n 28 above) and, more restrictively, see Berkeley v Secretary of State for the Envi-
ronment, Transport and the Regions (No.3) [2002] Env LR 14 (for comment see W. Upton (2002) 14 JEL at 346). 
C A S E  L A W  A N A L Y S I S 407
the more that the matter is one which is better judged by expert decision-makers,
as in significance questions.31 
As in Alford, therefore, whether something is done for an ‘intensive agricultural
purpose’ is not to be gleaned by a battle of dictionary definitions alone. It is a decision
which is predominantly to be determined as a matter of law, but it is also a decision in
respect of which other factors may need to be considered. These factors may not carry
great weight in the interpretive process but neither are they wholly irrelevant. 
A central difficulty in the Alford case is that the relevant project category—projects
for the use of uncultivated land or semi-natural areas for intensive agricultural pur-
poses—conflates different environmental problems; the loss of uncultivated land
and of semi-natural areas, and the problem of agricultural intensification. The latter
is well recognised as giving rise to environmental problems, especially in the form of
waste production, water pollution and amenity interferences. But the former can
lead to environmental problems regardless of the activity that gives rise to this. For
example, in addition to things like habitat damage or nutrient loss from activities
like the ploughing of meadows,32 additional problems can be caused, such as dam-
age to land of archaeological or landscape interest.33 The degree of severity of this
damage is not necessarily linked to the intensity of the agricultural operations. 
However, the categories listed in Annexes I and II of the EIA Directive are project
based—they are based on potentially harmful activities rather than potentially harm-
ful consequences. While listing according to consequences might have been envi-
ronmentally and ecologically preferable, the difficulty would have been that the
NEPA-avoidance approach, discussed above, would have been compromised. The more
that something falls within a project category because of the significance of its impacts,
the more that the importance of the project categories themselves melt away. 
The argument in favour of the DEFRA interpretation of what ‘intensive’ amounts
to—as one aimed at an increase in productivity for a given area of land—might be
made at its strongest by putting various considerations together. As I have argued
above, it is at least tenable that the overriding objective of the EIA Directive as con-
tained in Article 2(1) carries some weight, even in relation to classification ques-
tions. This is a matter on which the Court of Justice has yet to give a definitive ruling
but, as the Kraaijeved case in particular makes clear, there may be circumstances
where the purpose of the legislation demands that the courts take a particularly
31 A similar point could be made about the weight given to Article 2(1) in relation to national procedural
rules; there are several examples, even after Berkeley (No. 1), where the courts have stressed that principles of
good administration may dictate that a project ought not to be considered for environmental assessed when
this might otherwise have been required. See R (Jones) v Mansfield DC [2003] EWHC 7, per Carnwath LJ, para
59. See also R v North West Leicestershire District Council and East Midlands International Airport Ltd, ex parte Moses
(No.2) [2000] Env LR 443 and R v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham ex parte Trustees of the CPRE
[2000] 81 P&CR 73 (CA). There are ongoing proceedings brought by the Commission before the Court of
Justice in relation to the issues raised in the CPRE case. Generally on the tension between procedural EC law
and national procedural rules in EIA see K-H. Ladeur and R. Prelle, ‘Environmental Assessment and Judicial
Approaches to Procedural Errors—A European and Comparative Law Analysis’ (2001) 13 JEL at 185. 
32 In recent years [reference does not seem particularly recent], the first-time cultivation of meadows for
potato growing has given rise to particular problems, including potentially harmful increases in water abstrac-
tion for this thirsty crop. Between the 1930s and the 1980s, 97% of unimproved grassland in England and
Wales was lost, see R. Fuller, ‘The Changing Extent and Conservation Interest of Lowland Grassland in England
and Wales: a Review of Grassland Surveys 1930–1984’ (1987) 40 Biological Conservation at 281–300. See also
Judgment, para 20. 
33 See, generally, The State of Soils in England and Wales (Environment Agency, 2004). 
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broad approach to interpretation.34 There is also some authority that significance in
EIA must be judged relative to the status quo. This is a point that emerges from the
Ipswich Town Football Club case. In that case it was held that the significance of the
impact of a replacement of a football stand had to be judged in part by comparing
the effects of the development—on things like shadowing of neighbouring proper-
ties—with existing impacts from the current stadium.35 In addition, as has been
argued, how the courts review an exercise of discretion under EC law may properly
depend on the things that are intended to be protected through law.36 However,
even stacking all this up, the interpretation of categorisation questions is restricted
because of the list system adopted. Where this is the case, as in Alford, then ‘signifi-
cance’ in relation to categorisation questions is, I would argue, of little weight. 
It must be borne in mind, however, that one factor in giving the EIA Directive an
expansive reading, in cases like Grosskrotzenburg37 and Kraaijeveld, was to limit the scope
for Member States to evade their responsibilities and hence to further the effectiveness
of the Directive as a whole. In the former case, the mischief was the possibility that
mandatory EIA might be avoided by enlarging existing installations rather than devel-
oping new facilities; in the latter, that excessively high thresholds might be used in
practice to remove whole categories of projects from the need for assessment. Alford is
different to both cases, however, because there is no sense in which—at least following
the Agricultural EIA Regulations—the Member State or its public authorities are seek-
ing to avoid their responsibilities, either by a restrictive reading of the Directive or of
its implementing legislation. Indeed, a notable feature of Alford is that it is the relevant
competent authority that is seeking the more expansive interpretation. 
The compromise solution in relation to agricultural projects, therefore, serves to
emphasise that matters of significance must have a very restricted role to play in
determining as a matter of law the autonomous meaning of phrases like ‘intensive
agricultural purposes’. 
Does the Judgment Go Too Far? 
Thus far I have favoured the view that the restrictive judgment of the Divisional
Court is defensible if one understands the legislative history of the EIA Directive and
the limitations on taking a purposive approach to its interpretation. Indeed, the
Court stressed the need, following Kraaijeved, to take such an approach: 
34 As seen most clearly in Kraaijeveld in the Court’s interpretation of the Directive that modifications to
Annex II projects might themselves amount to Annex II projects (on which see now Annex II, para 13, added
by the amending EIA Directive 97/11/EC). 
35 R (Malster) v Ipswich Borough Council and Ipswich Town Football Club [2001] EWHC Admin 711. 
36 A point made in C. Hilson, ‘Legality Review of Member State Discretion Under Directives’ in T. Tridimas
and P. Nebbia (eds), European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century: Volume 1 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004),
where he uses a number of examples from environmental directives to question the limits of member states’
discretion in implementation, and argues that it may be proper under what Prechal calls ‘legality review’ (S.
Prechal, ‘Does Direct Effect Still Matter?’ (2000) 37 CML Rev at 1047)—the effet utile doctrine—to distinguish
the standard of review depending on whether matters of fundamental rights are at stake, as might be the case
where matters of human health are concerned, an approach that has parallels with that taken by the Stras-
bourg Court to the required intensity of review in fundamental rights cases (see Smith and Grady v UK (2000)
29 EHRR at 493). 
37 Case C-431/92 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-2189. 
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We do not consider that what was done in this case was capable of being described as an inter-
vention for intensive agricultural purposes, and although we remind ourselves that the EIA
Directive has a wide scope and a broad purpose, we do not consider that its framers intended
it to catch a project that was concerned only to bring land back to a normal level of agricultural pro-
ductivity. (emphasis added)38 
There are any number of environmentally harmful activities that could be
included in Annex II but which are omitted. The legislature chose certain kinds of
activities for intensive agricultural purposes, and this decision ought to be respected. 
However, in reply to the first question stated—does an increase in the productive-
ness of a given area, or an intensification of the agricultural purposes to which the
land is put come within the definition of ‘intensive agricultural purposes’?—the
Court answered: 
No, unless the productivity of the land for agricultural purposes is intensified above the norm. 
From this the Court seems to be defining ‘intensive agricultural purposes’ relative
to ‘normal agriculture’ rather than relative to prior agricultural uses of the land in
question. But this seems to imply that ‘normal’ agriculture is not intensive, some-
thing that most would find to be a problematic conclusion. In relation to the diction-
ary definition that the Court found more helpful, of ‘aiming to achieve maximum
production’, it might be asked whether, within the parameters of the CAP, farmers
ever set out to achieve production that is sub-optimal. It also begs the question as to
what ‘the norm’ is—is this something for the decision-maker to determine as a matter
of fact, or a matter of law for the courts to oversee? 
An ambiguity in the judgment, then, is that it is not clear what the standard is
against which to judge intensiveness—does it mean ‘the norm’ for the land, or ‘the
norm’ for agriculture generally? If it is the latter, then in practice this would make
the provision fairly meaningless. For example, on this interpretation the mere
ploughing of land per se would not be an ‘intensification above the norm’. If this is
the case, then the decision in Alford calls into question at least one previously suc-
cessful prosecution of a farmer under the Agricultural EIA Regulations for the
ploughing of four hectares of unimproved grassland without, it would seem, any fur-
ther ‘intensification’ in the sense of the application of synthetic fertilisers.39 
But if it is the norm for the land in question, then the issue is what time frame is
employed?40 As noted above, there is a strong suggestion in Alford that the Court was
reluctant to see the landowner prosecuted only for bringing the land back into pro-
ductive use. Indeed, although it is not specifically mentioned in the judgment, it is
worth noting that in 2002 Mrs Alford obtained vacant possession of the land at
Vixen Tor following a successful application to the Agricultural Lands Tribunal for a
Certificate of Bad Husbandry.41 However, issues of time are to be taken into account
when deciding whether land is ‘uncultivated’ or ‘semi-natural’, with a benchmark of
15 years discontinuation of activities like ploughing.42 Nevertheless, the point remains
38 Judgment, para 27. 
39 See ENDS Report 353, June 2004 at 62. 
40 Moorland is of course land which after the Ice Age was forested but subsequently cleared for sheep runs
and for timber, see Shoard, above n 15 at 76. 
41 Under s 346 Agricultural Holdings Act 1986. 
42 DEFRA, Guidelines, n 21 above, para 12. 
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that here the conservation interest that was said to be at stake arose from years of
bad agricultural husbandry. 
Perhaps the real root of the problem is that the concept of intensiveness is one
that might ordinarily be thought of as admitting of degrees, whereas the difficulty
here is that intensive is being used in an absolute way (an agricultural purpose being
either intensive or not).43 It is certainly difficult to characterise the modern agricul-
tural revolution as having a ‘big bang’ moment when production methods suddenly
shifted towards something that could be labelled intensive, and perhaps it is better
to see intensification as a process. Although the Court rejected the OED definition
of ‘intensive’—as referring to any increase in productivity rather than to an increase
of land under production—as being unhelpful to the prosecution’s case, perhaps
this is the better approach, and an approach which better fits the actual wording of
the Directive and the reference to ‘intensiveness’ alongside primarily unimproved
land. 
Vixen Tor: The Wider Picture 
The EIA prosecution at issue is not the only, nor even the main, legal dispute about
the Vixen Tor area. For decades, some of this land, including the Tor itself, was sub-
ject to de facto public access, no doubt in part because of the neglect and acquies-
cence of the previous tenants. Having blocked access on acquiring an interest in the
land in 2002, in March 2005 Mrs Alford was largely successful in a series of appeals
against the mapping of land in the area, including the Tor itself, for the purposes of
the ‘right to roam’ provisions of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000.44 To
fall within the definition of ‘mountain, moor, heath or downland’ to which, along
with common land, the 2000 Act extends, land must be ‘wholly or predominantly’ of
this kind. In the case of the field containing the Tor itself, the Inspector’s decision
was that the land was on balance not predominantly moorland because of the extent
of improved or semi-improved grassland. 
Some who are unhappy at the restrictions on access have therefore suggested
a link with the EIA prosecution by alleging that the improvements undertaken
were motivated in part at least by a desire to take the land out of the category of
‘mountain, moor, heath or downland’.45 This may have been reached because of
the actions of the spreading of the fertiliser that gave rise to the EIA prosecu-
tion. There is nothing in the Inspector’s report on the access dispute to suggest
that the spreading of the fertiliser tipped the categorisation of the Vixen Tor
field in particular away from being predominantly moorland. Nevertheless, the
concern remains that activities such as those undertaken by Mrs Alford may be
used as a means of avoiding the mapping of access land under CROWA 2000,
and that addressing this potential loophole was a motivating factor behind the
prosecution. 
43 I am grateful to Bill Howarth for this point. 
44 The Inspector’s appeal decision is available via the Planning Inspectorate website <www.planning-
inspectorate.gov.uk>. 
45 See e.g. ‘Access Shock at Vixen Tor Undermines CRoW Act’, British Mountaineering Council press
release, 24 February, 2005; ‘ ”Shock and anger” at Vixen Tor’, Ramblers’ Association press release, 25 February
2005; <www.ukclimbing.com/forums/t.php?t= 119922>. 
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Conclusion 
Farming has tended to be cosseted when it comes to its environmental impacts. JB
Ruhl, commenting on the US experience, has expressed this as an ‘anti-law’ that has
insulated modern agriculture from many of the regulatory controls that otherwise
apply to modern environmentally harmful activities.46 On the other hand, modern
agriculture has of course benefited from, and continues to benefit from, law in its
imperium mode. In the absence of planning law controls on the use of land for agri-
culture, and of conservation law protections for land like Vixen Tor (which presum-
ably is deemed not to be of sufficient interest to be designated on nature
conservation grounds), attention has turned in part to the role that EIA law might
play. In rejecting calls for the use of land for agriculture to be brought within the
planning system, however, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution noted
that the Agriculture EIA Regulations should be given time to show their worth, fail-
ing which the need for planning law to extend to controlling agricultural land use
might need to be reconsidered.47 
What we think of the decision in Alford may depend on whether the issue is
approached from a primarily agricultural or environmental perspective. From the
former, the actions of the farmer brought the land back to a more desirable, and legally
supported, state. But an environmental perspective eschews such considerations and
focuses on the consequences of the action. Although neglect can be a problem for some
conservation interests,48 here neglect was the reason for the conservation interest arising. 
It may be that the approach of the Court to the interpretation of the Regulations
is appropriate and defensible.49 But it is also clear that potential loopholes remain.
However, in this note I have tried to argue that these arise as much from the initial
drafting of the EIA Directive than from any lack of purposive interpretation by the
Court. It is certainly clear that, during the negotiation of the Directive, the poten-
tially harmful consequences of ploughing uncultivated land and semi-natural areas
were recognised, and that ‘intensive’ could simply not have been inserted into the
definition in Annex II. Against this, however, there is a clear difficulty in interpreting
‘intensive agricultural purposes’ in a way that catches at least some harmful activities.
This is a difficulty which, it is understood, may be addressed by the higher courts50—
and would not seem inappropriate for a reference to the Court of Justice. 
46 J.B. Ruhl, ‘Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law’ (2000) 27 Ecology LQ at 263,
288. For example, most US states have ‘right to farm’ laws, which protect agriculture from the effects of the
rule under which it is normally not a defence to an action in private nuisance to argue that the claimant ‘came
to the nuisance’. 
47 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Environmental Planning, Twenty Third Report, Cm 5459,
para 9.53. 
48 Provisions to counter damage to SSSIs from neglect are central features of the amendments to Part II of
the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, see s 28J (management schemes) and s 28K (management notices)
added by the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000. 
49 To give a flavour of reaction to the judgment, the Open Spaces Society was ‘appalled’ by it, see ‘Judgment
for Vixen Tor’, 11 May 2005 <www.oss.org.uk>. 
50 It is understood that DEFRA is likely to lodge an appeal. Also of note is the Public Consultation on Introduc-
tion of New Environmental Impact Assessment (Agriculture) (England) Regulations (DEFRA, August 2005).
